Attached below is a paper by Crispin Blunt MP, Chairman of UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, presented at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy in Malta on 28 April 2017.

Crispin Blunt MP also gave the following speech at a workshop in the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy:

European Defence Action Plan and EU-NATO relations

Friday 28th April 2017

I would like to thank my colleague Luciano Busuttil for kindly inviting me to make a keynote address to this workshop.

I invite participants to consider the role of the United Kingdom in European defence and external action when the UK ceases to be a member of the European Union in two years’ time. I want to make the case for a strong and special partnership between the EU and NATO and the UK and the EU in the years ahead.

The European Defence Action Plan, published in November, came in the wake of Trump’s election, and the Brexit referendum decision, and as instability continues to blight Europe’s neighbourhood. The Plan signalled a recognition that the EU must get its act together to take greater responsibility for its security by investing in defence capability and increasing efficiencies.

I believe that the UK should support this. Indeed, one of the consequences of leaving the EU is that the veto that the UK so often exercises on further EU defence integration and a permanent EU civilian-military headquarters leaves with us. In the interest of creating more defence capability in the interests of the European liberal democracies I think this is helpful.

As the EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw on 8th July 2016 recognises “A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing.” This point is reinforced by the Action Plan which says that a stronger EU in defence “ultimately means a stronger NATO”. The European democracies, whether in or out of the EU, or in or out of NATO, all need to work together to increase our defence output and to enhance our collective defence.

EU-NATO co-operation has been given increased urgency and importance by several trends.

First, the pre-existing trend of the United States in demanding more from its European partners has been rapidly accentuated by the new administration. As Vice-President Pence said at the Munich Security Conference in February about the NATO 2% defence spending commitment, “The President of the United States expects our allies to keep their word to fulfil this commitment and for most that means the time has come to do more”. EU defence cooperation using Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) provides a viable route to make this politically more palatable for many member states. PESCO should allow willing member states not only to purchase and develop shared capabilities and military assets under the coordination of the EDA, but to create multinational forces with a unified strategic command, fully inter-operable to NATO standards, so that they can be deployed as part of a NATO operation or an EU operation.

The second trend which gives urgency are the concerns about Russian aggression and in particular hybrid warfare. The EU-NATO Joint Declaration stresses the urgent need to boost our ability to counter hybrid threats. The work needed here will build on the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, and now the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. It has just been agreed that this new Centre, which will initially involve 7 NATO members including the UK and 2 non-NATO EU states, Finland and Sweden, will be established in Helsinki - demonstrating the deepening of NATO cooperation with non-NATO states.

The third development pushing EU-NATO cooperation is Brexit. Europe’s largest military and leading foreign policy actor will be inside NATO but outside the EU. Defence cooperation in recent years has largely been focused on bilateral and small-group initiatives. The UK will be at the forefront of these even after Brexit, for example, deepening Anglo-French cooperation under the Lancaster House Treaties, looking at more initiatives with Germany, and signing a defence cooperation treaty with Poland, as agreed in December. This serves both the EU and NATO, as more capability benefits both.

The UK would be in the best position to do this if creative ways can be found to ensure it is still able to participate in CSDP post-Brexit.

This could be formalised by a Framework Participation Agreement for UK involvement in CSDP missions, along the lines of other non-EU states such as the US, Canada, Norway, Ukraine and others.

However, I think we can and should be much more ambitious than this. I believe we can design practical arrangements for structured EU-UK cooperation in CSDP but also in CFSP; in the policy formulation which is the motor for the EU’s external action and civilian and military missions.

I want to present to you my ‘Proposal for Discussion’ for post-Brexit EU-UK cooperation on foreign and security policy. It takes the form of an informal ‘non-paper’ published on my website.

As a disclaimer: My paper is not a formal position of the UK Government or British Conservative Party. Rather, it is my informal contribution building on the spirit of the Government’s stated intentions to develop a “deep and special partnership between the UK and the EU” on security cooperation. I hope it can help start and contribute to a debate amongst colleagues and participants here about the possible models and mechanisms for post-Brexit cooperation. Indeed, I would welcome your thoughts and feedback on the ideas within it, drawing on your knowledge and expertise in the field.

The UK and EU have a clear common interest in maintaining a strong ongoing partnership. The principles which I suggest should underpin the future relationship are threefold: our shared values and interests, an ambitious and special partnership strengthening European defence, and inter-governmentalism and respect for autonomy of decision-making.

First, our shared values and interests in preserving peace and strengthening international security and respect for a rules-based international order. The UK and EU have much work to do together on maintaining the transatlantic alliance, managing migration challenges, tackling the terrorist threat within and beyond Europe’s borders, and facing potential threats from Russia to the east.

Second, the EU and UK should aim for an ambitious and special partnership, which recognises the UK as a distinct player - as a departing EU member state, one of the two permanent European members of the UN Security Council, a leading member of NATO, a leading player in international development assistance, and capable of projecting forces globally and strengthening European defence.

Third, inter-governmentalism and respect for autonomy of decision-making. The CFSP and CSDP are already substantially intergovernmental in nature, respecting the autonomy of EU member states in foreign and defence policy. Therefore, it should be possible to create mechanisms for a high degree of involvement of the UK, voluntarily and without a veto, in EU foreign, security and defence issues, respecting the autonomy of both the EU and UK.

Based on these guiding principles and objectives, I have proposed an outline for practical arrangements with three main components.

First, an Enhanced Framework Participation Agreement with a role for the UK in the development of CSDP mission concepts and the possibility of hosting Operation Headquarters, so that the UK could retain Northwood for Operation ATALANTA and could put Northwood and other centres at the disposal of future operations.

Second, crucial to an approach which delivers an enhanced level of cooperation across foreign and security policy will be the willingness to keep the UK close to the deliberations and workings of the Political and Security Committee – as the key coordinating body for the EU’s CFSP and wider external policy. I propose that the optimal way to achieve this would be through Permanent Observer Status for the UK in the PSC, governed by specific rules of procedure on speaking rights, rights to place items on agendas, how UK positions might be recorded in minutes and documents, and occasions when the UK representative might be absent from certain, sensitive discussions. Ways could be found whereby the UK could associate itself with Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council, coordinating the timing and content of any UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office statements.

Because the PSC is so central to the direction of European foreign policy - meeting at least twice a week at Ambassadorial level, monitoring the international situation and preparing positions and missions - the UK as an Observer would be able to shape, but not make decisions. Most would acknowledge that the UK’s involvement to date has added value, for example, on sanctions against Russia the UK’s leadership not only helped to build political consensus, but the Foreign Office also offered its expertise to lead the technical preparation of sanctions.

Third, regular high-level political dialogue. This would facilitate mutual understanding of each other’s thinking and positions and give a strong political signal about the importance of the EU/UK security partnership. To fulfil this, there could be a six monthly meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers and British Foreign Secretary, held on the occasion of one of the monthly Foreign Affairs Councils in Brussels. In addition, the UK and the holder of the EU Presidency could organise ad hoc EU-UK informal meetings if and when necessary. Furthermore, it would be important for British Foreign Office Ministers to meet the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy on a regular, monthly or quarterly, basis.

The deep and ambitious partnership I propose will be dependent on goodwill and new ways of working on both sides, but I have detected strong interest in forging such a relationship from colleagues here and in the EU diplomatic community in London. I hope the ideas within the paper can be refined and developed as the negotiations on the UK’s departure from the EU progress.

To conclude, it is worth quoting from the EU-NATO Joint Declaration.

“In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.”

This is the rationale and sentiment which is driving stronger EU-NATO cooperation and should be the template for a strong and fruitful EU-UK cooperation in foreign and security policy in the years ahead.